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1. Role of Agriculture in Viet Nam’s Economy 
 
Viet Nam’s agricultural sector provides approximately one-quarter of the 
country’s GDP, generates more than a third of its exports (in value terms) and employs 
over two-thirds of its labor force. In addition, about 80 percent of the population and 90 
percent of the poor live in rural areas so that 45 percent of the rural population still lives 
below the poverty line (World Bank 1999a).   
 
The gross value of agricultural production in 1997 was VND 88,663 billion in 
1994 constant prices (see Appendix Table A1).  Agricultural production is dominated by
rice.  Although its share has been gradually declining as farm households diversify their 
production base, rice still accounts for almost half of the gross value of agricultural 
output. Other food crops account for another 15 percent, industrial crops for 16 per ent 
and livestock for 17 percent. Agricultural production has hit record highs in 1998 and 
1999 with total grain production increasing by about 2 million tons per year to reach 
about 34 million tons in paddy equivalent in 1999.  Viet Nam has moved from being a net 
food importer in the mid 1980s to being the second largest exporter of rice in the world 
and its exports of rice have increased from about 1.4 million tons in 1989 to 4.5 million 
tons in 1999.   
 
In 1998, average annual income of a rural household was estimated at VND 9.84 
million (World Bank 1999a) with income from agriculture providing about 47 percent of 
total income, non-farm enterprises 19 percent, and wage and other income 34 percent. 
The agricultural sector has been performing well despite the latest slow down in the 
national economy. The average annual growth rate in the past five years was between 4 
and 5 percent fuelled by diversification into high-value crops (e.g. coffee, cashew nuts, 
rubber), increases in rice productivity, and expansion of cultivated area including 
irrigated rice. As a consequence, agricultural income rose by 61 percent between 1993 
and 1998 and was the main source of poverty reduction in rural areas during the five year 
period (World Bank 1999a).  During this same period, income from non-farm enterprises 
increased by 30 percent while income from wages and other sources declined slightly. 
 
Despite these achievements, the gap between rural and urban incomes widened 
between 1993 and 1998, mainly because urban incomes rose twice as rapidly as rural 
incomes (60 percent versus 30 percent) (World Bank 1999a).  Although the Government 
of Viet Nam (GOV) has not relinquished its stated goal of rapid “industrialization and 
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modernization,” 1 it recognizes the important role of agriculture in the sustainable 
development of the country and as an engine for broad-based p verty reduction and 
income growth. In particular, the GOV considers agricultural processing and off-farm 
rural service activities as one way of achieving its long-term development goals.   
 
2. Public and Private Roles in the Agricultural Sector 
 
Determining the roles of the private and public sectors in financing agriculture is 
a difficult task, particularly in transition economies such as Viet Nam that are undergoing 
rapid structural transformation.  Public investment in agriculture, if properly managed, 
can have positive impacts on agricultural productivity and can provide beneficial spill-
over effects inducing more private sector investment in the sector. For example, long-
term investment in research, extension, irrigation and rural infrastructure seem to have 
contributed significantly to the productivity growth of several Asian countries (Fan and 
Pardey, 1998).  In India in particular, Fan, Hazell and Thorat(1999) find that public 
spending on rural roads, and agricultural research and extension have had the largest 
impact on agricultural productivity growth and poverty reduction compared to other types 
of investments. If public spending is poorly targeted on the other hand, it can crowd-out 
private investment and result in large inefficiencies and a mis-allocation of resources 
hindering the growth of the sector.  Examples of these would include subsidizing 
inefficient crop sub-sectors or investing in marketing and processing activities that can be 
more effectively managed by the private sector.  
 
From an economic efficiency point of view, there is a role for government’s 
involvement in four main areas of the agricultural sector:  
 
i) areas considered as public good.  Public goods are goods that have two key 
characteristics: “nonexcludability2” and “nonrivalness.3”  In other words, they are goods 
for which once provided, one cannot exclude other consumers from using them and 
consumption by one person does not preclude consumption by another person.  In the 
case of public goods, the private sector will invest below the socially optimal level 
because private returns to these types of investments tend to be lower than the overall 
benefits to society as a whole.  Examples of public goods in the agricultural sector 
include items such as basic research, extension, large irrigation systems, and rural 
infrastructure.   
   
                                                   
1 Based on excerpts from the Government’s Report presented by the Prime Minister at the 4th S ssion of the 
10th Assembly on October 28th, 1998.  In addition, the Public Investment Program (PIP) of 1996-2000 
declared that the goal of the GOV is to reduce the agricultural share of GDP from 29 percent of GDP in 
1995 to 19- 20 percent in 2000. This was based on a GDP growth scenario of 9-10 pe cent, which was not 
achieved due to the slow down in the economy in the past 3 years.  Therefore, this structural shift will not 
be attained by the set date. In the Party Congress of 1996, the GOV stated that in 2020 Viet Nam should 
become an industrialized country.  
2 Goods are excludable when the consumer will be excluded from consuming them if he or she does not 
pay for them. 
3 Goods are rival when their consumption by one person precludes consumption by another person. 
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  ii) cases of market failure due to high transaction costs and poorly developed 
legal institutions. This occurs often in rural credit markets in developing countries where 
the absence of adequate land ownership rights, lack of official contract enforcement 
mechanisms, as well as poor information on credit worthiness, mean that private 
institutions will be reluctant to lend credit to farm households that do not possess a 
collateral. Therefore the government could intervene to help develop institutions that 
would reduce these transaction costs.  
 
iii) redistribution measures or safety nets for the poor, or for those who may be 
temporarily hurt by reforms, natural disasters, and idiosyncratic risks such as illnesses 
and accidents;  
 
and iv) provision of a legal and regulatory framework that facilitates private 
sector investment. This would include a functioning judicial system, regulations 
concerning market conduct (e.g. anti-trust law, contract law, consumer protection law,  
bankruptcy law, property rights law), etc. 
 
Experience elsewhere and in Viet Nam shows that the private sector is usually 
more efficient than the state in the provision of production, marketing, and trading 
activities, all examples of “private goods” having characteristics of excludability and 
rivalness.  In many countries, SOEs have been shown to be inefficient and to impose 
huge budgetary burdens on the state. Therefore, in many countries undergoing market 
reform, these activities were increasingly left to the private sector and the state gradually 
disengaged itself from them or became a minor player in the provision of these goods.  
Privatizing and dismantling SOEs is arguably a difficult task because of entrenched 
interests.  However, given their limited budgetary resources for all sectors including 
agriculture, governments might well be advised to concentrate their spending on areas 
that create the highest social payoffs and that cannot be effectively provided by the 
private sector.   
 
3. Public Expenditures in the Agricultural Sector 
 
What are the Government’s Priorities in the Agricultural Sector? 
 
According to the Public Investment Program (PIP) (1996-2000), there are some 
weaknesses in the agricultural sector, which include (i) agricultural output remains 
vulnerable to natural uncertainties (e.g. resulting from climate and from insect 
infestation); (ii) product quality remains low; (iii) there s limited adoption of technology 
in certain areas and sectors (particularly in remote and mountainous areas); (iv) 
infrastructure and agricultural services are still weak (the rural transport system is 
particularly weak in mountainous and remote ar as, limiting access to markets); (v) 
irrigation is limited mainly to rice production (80 percent of which is irrigated) – only 20 
percent of industrial crops are irrigated; (vi) rural electrification has a limited coverage; 
and (vii) rural capital markets are very underdeveloped and agricultural credit is still 
limited.  
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To address some of these weaknesses, the GOV has stated that its future priorities 
in the agricultural and rural sectors will be in the following areas: i) rural infrastructure 
(irrigation and flood control, rural roads, and electricity); ii) post-harvesting and 
processing activities; iii) reforestation and forest protection; iv) increasing agricultural 
productivity; v) increasing the quality of many crops, especially export crops; and vi) 
redistribution and poverty alleviation (ethnic minorities; mountainous areas)4. Several of 
these priorities go beyond the domain of agriculture and relate to overall rural 
development.  The recent initiatives such as the 5 Million ha Reforestation Program, the 
Hunger Eradication and Poverty Reduction Program (Decree 133/1998), and the 1715 
Poorest Communes program (Decree 135/1998), try to translate these priorities into 
ambitious programs that will have a dramatic impact on public spending. The following 
sections will focus on the level, composition, and effectiveness of public expenditures in 
agriculture.  
 
Level and Composition of Public Expenditures in the Agricultural Sector  
 
How does agriculture fare compared to other sectors?  
 
  As Table 1 demonstrates public expenditures in agriculture in 1994 constant 
prices have almost doubled from the 1992/1993 to the 1997/98 period.  This may reflect 
the renewed focus of the GOV on agriculture and the rural sector. However, public 
expenditures on agriculture s ill absorb between 5 and 6 percent of the total government 
budget. This is lower than for other South and East Asian countries such as China, India 
and Thailand, where the budget share for agriculture was between 8 and 16 percent in 
1990-93 (Fan and Pardey, 1998 – Table 13, p. 66 and Fan, Hazell, and Thorat, 1999 – 
Table 1, p. 8).  As a share of GDP, public expenditures on agriculture are about 1 to 1.5 
percent, in spite of the fact that agriculture contributes about one-quarter to th  total 
GDP.  
 
When expressed as a share of agricultural GDP, agricultural public expenditures 
constitute between 3 and 6 percent of total agricultural output which is again lower than 
for other East and South Asian countries with an average of 8 to 9 percent in 1990-93  
(Fan and Pardey, 1998 – Table 10, p. 64.).  Again in 1990-93, average government 
expenditures on agriculture per unit of agricultural labor in East and South Asia were 
about $130 in 1985 international dollars (Fan and Pardey, 1998 – Table 1, p. 65) 
whereas in Viet Nam, 1998 agricultural public expenditures per unit of agricultural labor 
were about $67 in 1989 international dollars.   
 
                                                   
4 Based on Excerpt from the Government’s Report presented by Prime Minister Phan Van Khai at the 4th 
Session of the 10th National Assembly on October 28th, 1998, and on the Report on the Review of the 
Recommendations from Constituencies – Presented by Mr. Vu Mao, member of the NA Standing 
Committee, to the deputies of the 10th NA at its 4th Session on 10th November, 1998, as well as the 1996-
2000 PIP. 
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Table 1  Public Expenditures in Agriculture 
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
Public Expenditures in 
Agriculture (in current 
VND billion) 1,125 1,283 2,238 3,495 na 3,712 4,591
    Capital Expenditures
861 896 1,690 2,782 2,455 2,709 3,493
    Current Expenditures
264 387 548 713 na 1,003 1,099
Public Expenditures in 
Agriculture (in 1994 
constant VND billion) 1,358 1,480 2,238 2,884 na 2,567 2,855
    Capital Expenditures 1,039 1,033 1,690 2,295 1,742 1,873 2,172
    Current Expenditures 319 446 548 588 na 694 683
As a percentage of the 
State Budget 5.4% 4.5% 6.1% 7.2% na 5.2% 6.3%
As a percentage of total 
GPD 1.0% 0.9% 1.3% 1.6% na 1.2% 1.3%
As a percentage of 
agricultural GDP 3.0% 3.1% 4.6% 5.6% na 4.6% 4.9%
Per agricultural person (in 
1994 VND) na na na 57,113 na 49,221 54,020
Per unit of agricultural 
labor (in 1994 VND) na na na 119,590 na 103,465 112,437
Sources: Data from 1992 to 1995 are from UNDP (1996), several tables.  
Data from 1996 are from the World Bank (1999b) - Table 5.5
Data for 1997 and 1998 are from the Ministry of Finance. 
 
These comparisons indicate that Viet Nam is lagging behind neighboring 
countries in the allocation of public funds to the agricultural sector. The comparisons, 
however, do not necessarily constitute an argument for a higher level of public spending  
in agriculture. The performance of the agricultural sector is e ated not only to public 
expenditures in the sector, but also to complementary measures affecting the rural 
economy, such as public expenditures in transport, education, and health. To make the 
argument that a higher level of public expenditures is warranted, one should consider the 
marginal impact of different sectoral expenditures on agricultural growth and show that 
agricultural spending has a higher return than other types of spending.  This exercise 
would require a substantive study that is beyond the scope of this paper.   
 
However, in spite of the current level of public expenditures in agriculture, Viet 
Nam’s agriculture has performed extremely well when compared to other countries in the 
region. With the exception of China, Viet Nam’s agricultural owth h s been the 
strongest among a wide range of developing (and developed) countries (see Table 2). 
Before advocating a higher level of expenditures in agriculture, it would be appropriate to 
see if the composition of capital and current expenditures is warranted in terms of the 
overall priorities established by the government. 
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Table 2  Average growth of agricultural sector in various countries 
  
Average Growth Rates (1990-97) 
Low income 2.5 
Lower middle income 1.3 
Upper middle income 1.7 
Low & middle income 1.6 
East Asia & Pacific 3.7 
Thailand 2.4 
Indonesia 2.8 
Philippines 1.8 
China 4.6 
India 2.5 
Vietnam 4.4 
Source: World Bank Development Indicators CD 
 
Although the GOV has declared agriculture a priority sector, this priority is not 
being fully translated into actual investment in agriculture. For example, in the 1996-
2000 PIP, the agricultural sector was allocated 23 percent of total state investment (see 
Appendix Table A2), almost twice as much as what the sector actually got in capital 
expenditures from the state in 1997 and 1998 (23 percent versus 12-15 percent). At the 
same time, however, public spending on transport, education, and health has increased, 
suggesting that agriculture and rural development are increasingly seen as stro l  linked 
to each other. 
 
What is the composition of public expenditures in agriculture?   
 
The most important sub-sectors for agricultural public expenditures in 1997 and 
1998 were irrigation (which absorbs 50 percent of the agricultural budget), two national 
programs on reforestation and land reclamation (14-17 percent), and forestry services and 
forestation (10 percent). On average, capital and current expenditures represent about 
three-quarter and one-quarter of total agricultural expenditures respectively.  Irrigation 
receives the lion share of capital expenditures (about 50 to 80 percent) whereas current 
expenditures are more evenly distributed between various subs-sect rs with the largest 
share going to forestry and related services (about 20 percent) (See Table 3). 
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TABLE 3 
CAPITAL AND CURRENT EXPENDITURES BY AGRICULTURAL SUB-SECTOR, 1997-1998 
(in million VND) ; (shares of Total Expenditure appear below each entry) 
       
  1997 1998 
  Total Total Total Total Total Total 
  Expenditure Capital Current Expenditure Capital Current 
    Expenditure Expenditure   Expenditure Expenditure 
Total 3,712,494 2,709,279 1,003,215 4,591,435 3,492,647 1,098,778
  100% 73% 27% 100% 76% 24%
   Of which:   Cultivation 130,725 72,758 57,967 189,373 111,623 77,750
  4% 2% 2% 4% 2% 2%
                     Animal husbandry 85,448 52,669 32,749 77,416 49,143 28,272
  2% 1% 1% 2% 1% 1%
                     Veterinary activities 65,970 17,898 48,072 68,917 18,114 50,804
  2% 0% 1% 2% 0% 1%
                   Forestry and related actvities 315,235 104,775 210,460 363,703 130,682 233,021
  8% 3% 6% 8% 3% 5%
                     Forestation 48,815 26,459 22,356 85,863 75,806 10,057
  1% 1% 1% 2% 2% 0%
                     Fixed cultivation and related activities 270,289 194,414 75,875 188,721 66,188 122,533
  7% 5% 2% 4% 1% 3%
                     Irrigation and related activities 1,806,371 1,651,112 155,259 2,469,736 2,307,102 162,634
  49% 44% 4% 54% 50% 4%
                     National programs on reforestation and land  
                     reclamation 642,702 489,576 153,126 642,702 489,576 153,126
  17% 13% 4% 14% 11% 3%
Note: The subtotals do not sum up to 100% due to missing information related to other components.    
Source:  Ministry of Finance (MOF)       
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Part of the reason for a strong bias towards irrigation and forestry in public 
expenditure in agriculture is because MARD is the consolidation of three previously 
separate ministries, namely irrigation, forestry, and agriculture. The public expenditures 
in agriculture reflect the weak integration of these three components rather than the 
general mandate of MARD to look at overall agriculture and rural development. 
 
What is the composition of subsidies and current transfers in agriculture? 
 
 In 1998, current expenditures were used for goods and services (about 64 
percent), salaries and wages (around 15 percent), subsidies and transfers (around 18 
percent), and other uses (3 percent).  Subsidies and transfers amounting to VND 195 
billion (see Appendix Table A3) were allocated mostly to sedentarization programs 
(VND 65 billion), crops (VND 31 billion), livestock (VND 23 billion), and irrigation 
(VND 21 billion). Subsidies and transfers equaled 18 percent of total current 
expenditures and 4 percent of total public expenditures in agriculture. Several questions 
remain to be answered in relation to the more detailed breakdown of these subsidies and 
transfers, the beneficiaries of these expenditures, and their actual uses. Yet, the data 
indicate a strong budgetary support for activities such as crops and livestock that might 
not constitute public goods. Finally, the high support for sedentarization programs 
deserves a closer scrutiny in light of possible negative effects on the environment (for 
example, when forests are cleared) and ethnic balance (for example, when an ethnic 
minority’s way of life is threatened by the inflow of migrants belonging to a majority 
group). 
 
 
What is the regional distribution of public expenditures in the agricultural 
sector?  
 
 In 1997 and 1998, 56 to 60 percent of total agricultural expenditures were spent at 
the central level; the rest was spent by local government in the provinces.  For irrigation, 
fixed cultivation and sedentarization, and the two national programs, a higher percentage 
is spent at the central than the local level. However, for other sub-sect rs, such as 
cultivation or animal husbandry, the largest share of the public expenditures is spent at 
the local level  (See Appendix Table A4).  
 
As Chart 1 demonstrates, there seems to be a positive albeit not very strong 
relationship between per capita agricultural GDP and per capita agricultural expenditures 
in the provinces5. This suggests that the state budgeting process does not significantly 
contribute in redistributing expenditures among the provinces or in alleviating poverty.  
For example, in 1998 agricultural expenditures in Quang Binh were VND 35,875 per 
agricultural person (about $2.5 per person) whereas in Ho Chi Minh City (HCMC) 
agricultural expenditures were VND 187,600 per agricultural person (about $13.4 per 
person). This suggests that richer provinces spend more on agriculture than poorer ones.  
                                                   
5 The trend is the same for 1997, therefore the chart for 1997 is not shown.  
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If the main objective of public expenditures in agriculture is to promote growth, this 
situation might be an appropriate one.  If, however, the main objective of public 
expenditures in agriculture is to promote regional balance, then provincial allocations of 
public expenditures are not fulfilling this role.   
 
Poor provinces, such as Quang Binh, are depend nt on the state for a large share 
of their expenditures and resources and therefore have little control over inter and intra-
sectoral budget allocation, except through voluntary contributions.  Richer provinces, 
such as HCMC, which generate surplus revenes above the targets set by the 
government, have more fiscal flexibility because they can allocate their surplus revenues 
according to their own priorities.  Thus control over budgetary resources at the local level 
depends on the ability of the localities to generate independent revenues.  This also 
means that the quantity and quality of agricultural and rural services vary significantly 
between provinces.  Another important issue is that once the provinces receive their 
transfer from the state budget, the trickle down to the districts and communes is not very 
transparent. Even if the state government allocates more funds to poorer provinces, it is 
not guaranteed that these funds will be targeted to the poorest communes or districts.  
 
It should not be forgotten, however, that other mechanisms of public expenditures 
are currently set in place by the GOV to target poverty, taking into consideration regional 
disparities.  The recently initiated 5 Million ha Reforestation Program and Programs 133 
and 135 try to tackle poverty problems in less favored regions through comprehensive 
rather than just through agricultural sector programs. 
 
CHART 1
Per capita Agric Spending vs. Per capita Ag GDP by province, 1998
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Public Expenditures and Agricultural Research  
 
The agricultural esearch system in Viet Nam is characterized by a very 
fragmented structure. There are about 30 agricultural research institutions,18 of which are 
under the control of MARD.  The rest are owned by commodity SOEs (rubber, tea, 
coffee, sugar, etc.) or are semi-independent institutions that receive government support 
but are also dependent on external sources of finance. Each institution has a fairly narrow 
research focus, small budgets and staff, and little coordination with other research 
centers. 
 
In 1996, the GOV had decided to re-organize the national agricultural research 
system as follows: (i) keep or merge some institutions but continue their full state funding 
(both salary and research funds); (ii) move some institutions or centers to SOEs and 
gradually reduce direct state funding to these centers; and (iii) spin-off some institutes to 
become independent self-financing organizations within 5 years (if unable to become 
independent, these would be dissolved.) However, the implementation of the re-
organization scheme has run into several difficulties related mainly to problems in 
identifying which centers to merge, the resistance of some centers to be cut-off from state 
funding, and the resistance of some SOEs to be stuck with an under-funded research 
center. 
  
The evidence indicates very low levels of state contribution to agricultural 
research.  As Table 4 below shows, total public expenditures for agricultural research in 
1997, 1998 and 1999 were about VND 80 billion. This is equivalent to 1.7 percent of 
public expenditures in agriculture and 0.08  percent of agricultural GDP. In comparison, 
China spends about 6 percent of its agricultural expenditures on research, while Malaysia, 
Pakistan and Thailand invest about 10 percent;  other Asian countries spend at least 3 
percent  (Fan and Pardey 1998, Table 16, p. 70). Therefore, by any standards, the 
amounts in Viet Nam are very low and cannot sustain an effective research program to 
develop improved crop and breed varieties and increase the quality and marketab lity of 
Viet Nam’s agricultural exports.  Even when taking into account the additional funding 
that research institutes can raise from local level and other sources, the total budget for 
research is still low.  As Appendix Table A5 shows, the central level funding of several 
research institutes was between 50 and 60 percent of total expenditures between 1996 and 
1998; local sources contributed between 10 and 30 percent.  
April 21, 2000 
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Table 4  State budget for agricultural research (in current VND million) 
        
Sub-sector 1997 1998 1999 
  Total Research Salary Total Research Salary Total Research Salary 
Food Crops 21,433 4,951 14,868 24,024 6,552 16,052 23,964 6,772 16,022 
Forestry 7,883 1,749 4,869 10,232 3,494 5,208 9,215 2,658 5,187 
Fruit and Vegetable 4,168 930 2,958 4,564 1,270 3,244 3,162 1,912 1,151 
Industrial and Export Crops 9,048 1,416 7,418 6,677 1,370 4,882 4,363 1,535 2,648 
Livestock and Veterinary 10,490 3,072 5,877 12,846 4,715 6,446 12,571 4,060 6,545 
Plant Protection and Land Management 5,568 1,576 3,084 2,944 1,110 1,764 3,265 990 1,795 
Post Harvest Technology 2,572 825 1,047 0 0 0 1,501 1,484 0 
Water Resources 10,248 5,273 3,065 11,660 5,882 3,223 10,201 4,396 3,360 
Other Sub-sectors 7,656 2,285 4,194 13,613 4,202 7,141 12,340 4,204 6,532 
Total  79,066 22,077 47,380 86,560 28,595 47,960 80,050 28,011 43,240 
Source:  MARD          
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In 1999, the number of scientific research staff was about 4,874. However, only 
4,114 were approved for funding by the Ministry of Finance (MOF).  More than half f 
agricultural research expenditures are used to cover salaries and other administrative 
costs.  Total spending on salaries and current expenditures for research staff for 1999 
were VND 43 billion or the equivalent of VND 10.5 million per staff per year. The 
budget share for research activities proper is only around one third of total agricultural 
research (see table 5).  Most of the research was devoted to food crops and livestock 
breeding, with little attention devoted to activities such as postharvest research, plant 
protection, and horticultural products.  
 
 
Table 5  Shares in total expenditures and research expenditures 
 1997 1998 1999 
  
Share of 
subsector 
in total 
research 
budget 
Share of 
research 
in 
subsector 
budget 
Share of 
subsector 
in total 
research 
budget 
Share of 
research 
in 
subsector 
budget 
Share of 
subsector 
in total 
research 
budget 
Share of 
research 
in 
subsector 
budget 
Food Crops 27% 23% 28% 27% 30% 28% 
Forestry 10% 22% 12% 34% 12% 29% 
Fruit and Vegetable 5% 22% 5% 28% 4% 60% 
Industrial and Export Crops 11% 16% 8% 21% 5% 35% 
Livestock and Veterinary 13% 29% 15% 37% 16% 32% 
Plant Protection $ Land Management 7% 28% 3% 38% 4% 30% 
Post Harvest Technology 3% 32% 0%   2% 99% 
Water Resources 13% 51% 13% 50% 13% 43% 
Other Sub-sectors 10% 30% 16% 31% 15% 34% 
Total  100% 28% 100% 33% 100% 35% 
Source:  MARD       
 
 
The current agricultural research system in Viet Nam calls for both institutional 
and budgetary reform.  State funds to agricultural research need to be increased to at least 
2 percent of agricultural GDP as recommended by the World Bank (UNDP 1996).  That 
would translate in over 100 percent increase in the budget currently devoted to research.  
Because of its low base, such an increase would still be small in absolute terms when 
compared to the overall agricultural budget. Returns to investment in agricultural 
research are known to be very high worldwide. For example, Fan and Pardey (1998) 
show that public investment in agricultural research has contributed for about 20 to 40 
percent of the agricultural production growth of 9 Asian countries. Investing in research 
is crucial if the GOV wants to achieve its stated goal of raising agricultural productivity 
and enhancing its competitiveness in world agricultural markets.  In 1996, average paddy 
yields in Viet Nam were still smaller than those in China or Indonesia (3.6 tons/ha versus 
6.1 and 4.5 respectively). Therefore, the country still has a lot of potential to increase its 
crop productivity, but it has not invested the adequate amount of funds to support this 
research. Increased public funding needs to be accompanied by more rapid 
May 22, 2000 
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implementation of the re-organization program that the GOV decided to undertake in 
1996.  
 
Public Expenditures and Agricultural Extension 
 
Despite a long history of agricultural extension in Viet Nam, the national 
agricultural extension service was only created in 1993. The current national system 
consists of central, provincial and district level service organizations. Under the 
responsibility of the MARD, a Steering Committee for Extension evaluates, formulates, 
supervises, and allocates funds for extension projects.  Each province has an extension 
center with an average staff of 15 to 24 workers (see Table 6).  At the district level, 
District Extension Stations  were created to provide training and demonstrations to 
farmers with an average of 1 to 6 workers per station. However, not all districts have an 
extension station. At the commune level, village extension agents are hired on a 
contractual basis for various extension projects.  
 
The national extension service suffers from a scarcity of staff (including well-
trained extension agents) and limited resources. Only 70 percent of districts have an 
extension station and only 30 percent of communes have an extension unit. A total of 
2,757 extension workers at the province and district level serve a farming population of 
10 million households (see Table 6 below). 
  
The contribution of the MARD to agricultural extension consists mainly of 
current expenditures to cover the operating and administrative costs at the central level 
and part of the operating costs at the local level. The salaries of extension officers at the 
provincial and district level organizations are paid from the provincial budgets.  This 
means that local spending on agricultural extension is dependent on the wealth of the 
province.  In fact, most of the expenditures on agricultural extension is done at the 
province level.  Information on selected provinces indicates that around 75 percent of 
total expenditures on extension comes from local budgets (see Appendix Table A6).  
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Table 6  The Public Agricultural Extension Service 
 
Region Number of 
Provincial 
Extension 
Centers 
Average 
staff per 
provincial 
center 
Number of 
District 
Extension 
Stations 
Average staff 
per district 
station 
NW 12 16.6 94 4.9 
NE 4 23.3 27 2.3 
RRD 9 22.5 50 1.4 
NCC 6 21.0 61 4.6 
SCC 8 17.8 29 2.5 
CH 4 15.2 37 2.8 
NES 6 20.5 24 4.3 
MRD 12 28.6 55 6.2 
Viet Nam 61 23.1 337 4.0 
Source: MARD 
 
As Table 7 shows, MARD spending on agricultural extension has declined 
substantially after 1997. In 1998, the MARD spent VND 27 billion on agricultural 
extension. This is equivalent to 2.5 percent of total current expenditures in the 
agricultural sector and only 0.6 percent of total agricultural spending.  It also represents 
about $0.2 of extension dollars per farm household.  Assuming that 75 percent more is 
spent at the local level, this means that overall public expenditures on extension services 
are about VND 100 million. 
 
 
Table 7  MARD expenditures on Agricultural Extension 
(in million VND – Current and Constant 1994 Prices)
 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 
Total 
Expenditures 
in current 
prices 
13,575 15,828 24,079 29,820 27,143 27,664 
Total 
Expenditures 
in constant 
1994 prices 
13,575 13,059 17,089 20,622 16,880 na 
Source: MARD 
 
A disaggregation of the 1999 MARD extension budget by sub-sector i  presented 
in Table 8. The shares indicate more emphasis on the dynamic areas of agriculture such 
as livestock, industrial crops, and aquaculture. This allocation is not proportional to the 
respective shares of these sub- ctors in agricultural GDP, perhaps an indication of a 
strategy that gives priorities to those sub-sectors with higher potential. Noteworthy, 
however, is the limited amount of resources devoted to training.  Also, virtually absent is 
extension to promote marketing of agricultural activities. The relatively recent 
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institutionalization of a national extension service means there is an on-going need to 
strengthen the capacity of its staff with skills adequate to carry out transfer of new 
technologies to farmers.  The link with research institutes also appears weak and often 
competitive rather than cooperative.  
 
Table 8  Extension State Budget Allocation to Different Agricultural Sub-sectors in 
1999. 
    
Sub-sector Share in the  
extension budget 
Food crops 22.3 % 
Industrial and fruit crops 23.6 % 
Livestock 18.8 % 
Forestry 11.3 % 
Aquaculture 10.1 % 
Information and training 8.8 % 
Other 5.2 % 
Source: MARD 
 
The findings above suggest that similar to the agricultural research system,   
extension services in Viet Nam need both institutional strengthening and budgetary 
reform. The institutional strengthening should include a reorganization of extension 
services that avoid the current practice of public extension staff to be involved in 
commercial activities such as input distribution to richer farmers and stresses the need of 
participation of farmers and agroindustry representatives in extension advisory boards.  
The limited funds that are allocated to extension and research call for a reallocation of 
resources from less productive investment towards these two critical services. Extension 
services are key for the adoption of technology by farmers and to improve the 
productivity and returns of the farm sector. The extension budget should be increased at 
least to expand extension services in the districts and communes that still do not have an 
extension center with priority given to the poorest communes.  
 
Public Expenditures and Forestry 
 
The upland areas have long been seen as impoverished and “backward,” but they 
are increasingly viewed by the central government as a storehouse of natural resources 
necessary for national economic development.  The last decade has seen a proliferation of 
policies and programs related to natural resource management, especially regarding 
forest, watershed and soil (Nguyen, 1998).   Although these programs intend to contribute 
to national wealth and the well-being of those living in the uplands, they risk contributing 
to natural resource degradation and unsustainable agricultural practices, and therefore an 
increased income gap between the highlanders and lowlanders. 
 
In 1993, the government initiated Program 327 “Re-Greening the Barren Hills”.   
“Baren land" covered 12-13 million hectares, including 60-65 percent of the hills in the 
Northern Uplands and 25-33 percent of the land in the Central Highlands.  This program 
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was allocated US$68 million, which was a large share of central government transfers to 
the provinces.  About 40 percent of these funds were earmarked for interest-fr e l ans to 
households. The remaining 60 percent was for government investment in infrastructure, 
scientific and technical facilities, public services, reforestation, and ini i l support to 
settlers.  By the end of 1998, the GOV had invested about US$270 million (VND 2,980 
billion) into this program (GOV, 1999).  Of this, about 14 percent was interest-free credit 
and the remainder was "government direct investment." 
 
Under the program, the government planned to grant use rights to parcels of 
barren land and to protect certain tracts of remaining forest land.  Parcels of forest land, 
usual forest under the control of state- wned forestry enterprises, were to be transferred 
to households.  Forest allocation was to be about 1 hectare per family member and the 
government planned to pay VND 50,000 annually to households for each hectare of 
forest they were protecting.  As a result of limited resources, however, the 
implementation was incomplete.  In 1998, for example, a survey team led by staff of the 
Center for Natural Resources and Environmental Studies of Vietnam National University 
found that Decree 327 had been implemented in 2 villages out of 16 in Dakto Kan 
Commune, Dakto District, Kon Tum Province.  The forest protection payments had 
initially been made in 1996 in these villages, but subsequently had not been made in 1997 
or 1998. It was not clear whether in the absence of expected payments, the new “owners” 
of the forest land would feel at liberty to begin mining the resource. 
 
According to the World Bank (1995), some weaknesses of Program 327 included:  
· A lack of planning and prioritization on the basis of land use and economic 
returns 
· Virtually all projects were on-goi g, sel cted for their readiness for 
implementation rather than from in-depth assessment of priority needs, constraints 
and institutional capacity 
· Funds were spread over too many projects, and in many cases were not sufficient 
to achieve their objectives 
· High administrative and operating costs (about 23 percent of the total). 
State-directed approaches in project development and implementation were used 
with virtually no participation of affected units or households in resource planning. 
 
In 1998, the government lau ched the Five Million Hectare Reforestation 
Program, absorbing Program 327 into a more ambitious national program.  The main 
objective is to speed up reforestation activities, with the target of raising Vietnam’s forest 
cover from 28 percent to the 43 percent, the rate at the time of national independence.  At 
the same time, the program hopes to establish areas for production of fuelwood for 
domestic consumption and raw materials for processing and export, thus raising incomes 
for people in the mountainous areas. 
 
According to the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development (GOV, 1998), 
implementation difficulties facing the program include:  
 
· Land use planning: The actual area of land to be forested has not yet been defined, 
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and it is unclear whether the land is available. Some of the land is already being 
farmed, and even that land under management of enterprises or state forestry 
organizations is already being put to use. 
· Selection of tree species: The results of plantation efforts in Vietnam are unclear 
and in some cases not efficient, partly because timber grown in plantation forests 
has not yet found a market.  It is not yet clear whether the processing capacity and 
the market for forest products is large enough to justify such a large forested area. 
· Cost of forest protection: An appropriate incentive policy and functioning 
mechanisms to achieve reforestation without over-stressing the government 
budget. The lesson from Program 327 is that uncertainties still exist on how to 
effectively provide equitable and effective forest protection incentives to local 
populations. 
 
Some draft recommendations for effective implementation of the program include 
that land use planning and allocation to different economic sectors should be done 
quickly; that present forest contracting system should be clearly defined so people can 
enjoy benefits from protecting forest; and that land for reforestation should be determined 
based on the requirements of agricultural production; and allow for agroforestry activities 
and diversified forest products (GOV, 1998). 
 
 
 
Public Expenditures and Irrigation  
 
About 80 percent of the 7 million hectares of cultivated land area in Viet Nam are 
equipped with some sort of irrigation, the majority of which is dedicated to rice.  The 
MARD is usually responsible for primary irrigation infrastructure, while local 
governments (provinces, districts and communes) are responsible for secondary and 
tertiary infrastructure.  Large and medium scale irrigation works are managed by 174 
Irrigation Managem nt Companies (IMCs), three of which are under the control of 
MARD and 171 are under local government control. Together, they employ a total of 
20,000 staff.   
 
As mentioned earlier, irrigation absorbs about 50 to 55 percent of the agricultural 
state budget, 80 to 90 percent of which is dedicated to capital expenditures (see Table 9).  
Total public spending on irrigation has increased almost two-folds ince 1992, however 
the share dedicated to recurrent expenditures has been shrinking dramatically (from about 
20 percent in 1992/93 to 10 percent in 1997/1998). This trend reflects the fact that about 
50 percent of operation and maintenance (O&M) costs are now covered by the IMCs, the 
accounts of which are not included in the state budget (for an example of the costs and 
revenues of two IMCs, refer to Appendix Tables A7–A12).  However, the allocation of 
the state budget to cover the remaining portion of O&M costs is not enough to effectively 
maintain the existing systems resulting in deteriorating infrastructure a d low capacity 
utilization. As described below and in Section 4, the imbalance between current and 
capital expenditures in irrigation reduces the efficiency of new investments in this sector.  
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Table 9  Public Expenditures on Irrigation  
 (in billion VND, current and 1994 constant prices (in parentheses)) 
 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 
Total 
Expenditures 
558 
(674) 
814 
(939) 
1,542 
(1,542) 
1,804 
(1,488) 
 1,806 
(1,249) 
2,470 
(1,536) 
  Current 
Expenditures 
102 
(123) 
191 
(220) 
302 
(302) 
288 
(238) 
 155 
(107) 
163 
(101) 
  Capital 
Expenditures 
456 
(551) 
623 
(719) 
1,240 
(1,240) 
1,516 
(1,251) 
1,355 
(962) 
1,651 
(1,142) 
2,307 
(1,435) 
Sources: UNDP (1996), World Bank (1999b) and Ministry of Finance 
 
According to the MARD, the total estimated value of irrigation wo ks in 1994 
prices was VND 60 trillion. The estimated O&M cost needs of the existing irrigation 
system are VND 1,200 - 1,500 billion per year (excluding costs of depreciation, major 
upgrades and repairs, and rehabilitation of damaged infrastructure due to natural 
disasters, the total of which would cost an additional one trillion VND ).  Irrigation fees 
collected from water users represent about VND 600 billion per year. The shortfall 
between irrigation O&M costs and revenues from water fees is partially covered hrough 
state subsidies that go directly to finance IMC losses. State subsidies to IMCs amount to 
about VND 22 billion per year.  The rest of the funds needed to cover O&M costs are 
either collected through donor grants or more often than not, irrigation systems are left to 
deteriorate because of lack of money. In many areas, especially poor ones, communes 
rely on voluntary contributions from farmers (either in labor or in cash) to maintain and 
repair tertiary canals in the villages.   
 
Because basic IMCs’ costs such as salaries, administration, and electricity have to 
be paid, under-funding of O&M costs results mainly in poor maintenance and under-
utilization of existing capacity. According to the World Bank (1996), “of the 4 m ha of 
cultivated paddy (60 percent of agricultural land), 3 m ha are equipped with some kind of 
irrigation. However, due to incomplete systems, planning or design deficiencies, 
deterioration, lack of water and poor operations, only 2 m ha are actually irrigated.”  
Discussions with several government officials also suggest that capacity utilization of the 
existing irrigation infrastructure is only about 60 percent.  Capacity utilization in 
mountainous and remote areas is particularly low and cost recovery is lower than for the 
rest of the country.   
 
Similar to the situation in many developing countries, inadequate cost recovery 
and deteriorating infrastructure are a major concern to Viet Nam’s government. Although 
current cost recovery through water fees is less than 50 percent, Viet Nam fares better 
than other countries such as Thailand and Malaysia where O&M cost recovery is very 
low (the irrigation fee in Thailand is about $2 per ha per season compared to an average 
of about $30 in Viet Nam).  On the other hand, cost recovery in the Philippines is high 
and the irrigation fee pays for a large portion of capital investment (Abernethy and Heim 
1999).  
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The basic guidelines for charging water fees were set in Viet Nam in Decree # 
112 (1984) at the rate of 3 to 8 percent of paddy yields (payable in paddy or in equivalent 
cash terms). The rates vary by type of irrigation and drainage system used (gravity or 
pumping), quality of service delivery, and by season.  The actual rates charged by the 
IMCs in each province are negotiated with and approved by the Province People’s 
Committee (PPC) and can vary quite substantially from one region to the next.  
Collection of the water fee and cost recovery can differ markedly among IMCs as well; 
while most IMCs incur losses, some have much higher levels of cost recovery than others 
(see for example Appendix Table A7– A12)6.  The distribution of the water fees among 
the IMCs, local governments and the communes also vary substantially by region.  
 
According to the MARD, the irrigation fee would have to be doubled to cover 
only O&M costs. Meanwhile most depreciation costs and the cost of investment in new 
construction works or pumps as well as major rehabilitation and repairs are provided as a 
subsidy by the state.  Without necessarily increasing the water fee which could be 
detrimental to poor farmers, there is scope for improving cost recovery and system 
performance in Viet Nam. There are four major sources of inefficiencies with the current 
system that if well addressed could substantially improve cost rec ry. These 
inefficiencies include the following: 
 
(1) The official irrigation fee is often not fully paid by the farmers or the 
communes and districts do not transmit the full amount owed under contract to the IMC.  
Many farmers are not willing to pay the official fee because they complain that the 
systems are unreliable and the quality of service delivery is very poor.  Some IMCs are 
even reluctant to sign contracts where farmers could pay in advance for the fee because 
they fear they will not be abl  to deliver the amounts requested by farmers. 
 
(2) The irrigation fee is based on the volume and type of crop production7 rather 
than on the volume of water use resulting in excessive and inefficient water usage.  
Because of lack of water rights, farmers do not have an incentive to conserve water or to 
pay the fee that will maintain the system, unless the fee is based on consumptive use. 
 
(3) Related to issue # 2, commodity targets, where farmers are encouraged to 
grow certain crops such as paddy through increased public investment and support, 
prevent the allocation of water to those crops with the highest returns to water use. Many 
farmers complain that they cannot afford current water prices, mainly because they are 
getting little returns from their wat  use. Low crop profitability reduces the willingness 
of farmers to pay for water.    
 
                                                   
6 According to a MARD official, a pumping station in Ha Giang Povince was recently sold to a private 
company. In 1998, this company turned in substantial profits by raising the water fee and improving its 
collection. This could be an example to set for other IMCs which could be privatized or their management 
contracted out to private enterprises. 
7 The water fee for other crops (such as vegetables or sugar cane) is priced at 40 percent of the fee charged 
for paddy production. 
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(4) The water fee is collected in paddy or its equivalent in cash. The PPC 
determines the price at which measures of rice are converted to cash and sets the price at 
10 percent below the market price to encourage payment in cash.  This means that the fee 
varies with the production and the price of paddy rather than being determined by the 
supply and demand for water.  
 
In short, the irrigation system in Viet Nam suffers from both financial and 
organizational problems. On the financial side, several measures could be considered. 
First, the irrigation fee should be based on volume of water use rather than on paddy 
production8. Second, the water fee should be charged and paid in cash and not in paddy 
and should be regardless of what and how much is produced with it.  Third, commodity 
targets should be reconsidered as they limit the choice of farmers to allocate water 
resources in the most efficient way and reduce their willingness to pay for water. Fourth, 
the GOV should perhaps focus its investments in irrigation on rehabilitation and repair of 
existing systems rather than on construction of new systems which cannot be maintained 
in the long-term. Further deterioration in the rrigation system will impose a heavier 
budgetary burden on the GOV in the long-run.  Raising the water fee should only be 
instituted once the current collection system is improved and once stronger institutions or 
organizational changes are put in place to manage irrigation more effectively and provide 
better irrigation and drainage services.  
  
On the organizational side, to have a sustainable irrigation system, institutional 
reform is needed where the primary beneficiaries participate and contribute in operation 
and management. At present, there is no incentive for the farmers to pay their fee in full 
and there is equally no incentive for the local authorities or the IMCs to cover all their 
O&M costs. An efficiently functioning system would require linking water users rights 
and responsibilities with the benefits and costs of the system. One way to do so, is to 
have water user associations where farmers are responsible for financing, operating, and 
maintaining the system and where the benefits from th schemes accrue to them directly. 
These types of organizations also encourage the efficient use of water and the protection 
of water works.  
 
Some water user organizations have already been successfully implemented in 
parts of Viet Nam and elsewhere in the world and could be replicated throughout the 
country if possible. For example, in Tuyen Quang Province, irrigation systems are now 
successfully managed and maintained by a water user association that took over the 
responsibilities of the previously existing IMC.  Similarly, a pilot project financed by the 
Asian Development Bank (ADB), where water user associations were developed to 
manage the irrigation systems of North Nghe An and Son Chu, has received very high 
performance ratings.  These schemes have ben highly effective in terms of increasing 
                                                   
8 In one province where irrigation fees were based on usage, farmers reduced water use considerably and 
costs were fully recovered, resulting in benefits to both farmers and the IMC. One implementation problem 
sometimes posited is installing and supervising water meters to measure the volume of water used. 
However, technical staff of the MARD suggest that consumption rates can be approximated through the 
calibration of sluices or through the volume of fuel used in case of electric water pumping.  
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farmers’ productivity due to more reliable water supply, reducing maintenance costs, 
increasing collection of water fees, improving water use and irrigation efficiency, and 
decreasing  subsidies required from the state.  
 
Public Contribution to Agricultural Production and Processing Activities 
 
 Rural farm households provide the bulk of agricultural output in Viet Nam.  
However, agricultural processing and marketing activities are largely dominated by 
SOEs. The central and local government own over 1,400 enterprises in the agricultural 
sector (excluding the IMCs) (See Table 10). Although, the number of agricultural SOEs 
has declined since 1996, they still represent about a quarter of all SOEs in the country. In 
addition, according to the 1996-2000 PIP (See Appendix Table A2), the total projected 
investment of VND 95.5 trillion in agriculture was going to be provided by a mixture of 
state investment (23 percent), SOEs investment (45 percent), households investment (25 
percent) and FDI (7 percent).  This implies that SOEs are still expected to play the major 
role in agricultural investment. For example, in 1997, total investment in agriculture was 
only 7 percent of total investment and only about a quarter of it was private investment. 
The question is whether the investments by SOEs are money well spent or whether it 
would be more efficient to spend state revenues on other activities.  
 
Table 10  Number of SOEs in Agriculture and Forestry 
 1996 1997 1998 1999 
Total # of SOEs 6,200 5,816 5,718 5,462 
 of which: SOES in 
agriculture & forestry 
(excluding IMCs) 
1,591 1,538 1,454 1,424 
Source: Ministry of Finance 
 
 SOEs in the agricultural sector are involved in a variety of activities including the 
production and processing of sugar, rubber, coffee, tea, seeds, breeds, fertilizers, etc. It 
can be argued that many of these activities should be carried out by the private sector.  
However, the environment conducive for this to happen is not yet available. While many 
of these SOEs no longer receive direct subsidies, they receive indirect subsidies in 
various forms such as loans at concessionary interest rates, debt forgiveness, tax 
exemptions, and preferential access to land and infrastructure.  For example provincial 
fertilizer companies may receive interest rate subsidies on outstanding loans, exemptions 
from depreciation costs, transport cost subsidies to transport fertilizer to remote areas, as 
well as subsidies to store higher levels of fertilizers to support the stability fund.  
 
Table 11 shows some figures on state budget transfers to subsidize certain SOEs.  
For example, fertilizer SOEs received an interest rate subsidy of 22 billion in 1998, an 
amount almost equal to the total MARD budget on agricultural extension in 1998. Total 
subsidies in 1997 for the three types of SOEs shown below were higher than the state 
budget on agricultural research.  State subsidies to SOEs are not always transparent and 
are hard to trace and measure.  For example, the sugar industry is indirectly subsidized 
through local policies favoring conversion of land to sugar cane production and 
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administrative restrictions on imported sugar that is cheaper than the locally produced 
one. According to analysis by Goletti and Rich (1998), the government’s prot ction of 
the sugar industries costs the society about USD 92 million per year mainly because of 
higher consumer prices.   
 
Table 11  State Subsidies to SOEs 
(Million VND) 
 
Type of Subsidy 1996 1997 1998 
1. Interest rate subsidies for 
food 
67,400 30,250 18,310 
2. Interest rate subsidies for 
fertilizer 
21,687 50,160 21,629 
3. Subsidy for livestock 
production and price support for 
chicken breeding 
6,000 9,000 11,000 
Total 95,087 89,410 50,940 
 
 
Evidence from different studies suggests that many of the SOEs in sugar, rubber, 
or beer are loss-making enterprises and are inefficient. In the sugar sector for example, 
many refineries are uncompetitive and are located in areas where not enough sugar is 
being produced resulting in under-utiliz d capacity. Even the GOV recognizes that “in 
the countryside, agricultural and industrial facilities operate inefficiently (sugar 
companies, cement from blast furnaces, tunnel brick making, beer companies, state-
owned farms and state forestry farms)” (Socialist republic of Vi t Nam, 1998). According 
to the IMF, of the 50 most-indebted SOEs out of a sample of 1,044 state enterprises, food 
enterprises were the most indebted, accounting for 24 percent of the group’s total debt. In 
general, out of 5,429 SOEs enterprises that wre studied by the MOF, about 40 percent 
were classified as profit-making enterprises, 44 percent were temporary loss-makers, and 
16 percent were permanent loss-makers (IMF 1999).  Within the central SOEs engaged in 
agriculture, about 17 percent were making losses in 1998 (see Table 12). The average 
loss of these unprofitable SOEs was VND 8.4 billion, while the average profit of the 
profitable SOEs was VND 1.3 billion. This suggests that large losses made by a few 
SOEs are more than offsetting the profits made by the majority of SOEs. In fact, in 1998, 
total net losses (total losses – total profits) amounting to VND 288 billion would result in 
an average loss of VND 0.58 billion per SOE. 
 
 
Table 12  Information on Agricultural SOEs Owned by the Central Government  
 Unit 1996 1997 1998 
1- Total of enterprises No 476 472 497 
1.1- Number of Public enterprises  No 14 18 49 
1.2 Number of Profit enterprises  No 315 351 326 
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1.3 Number of Self-Subfficient enterprises No 24 26 38 
1.4- Number of enterprises with losses No 123 77 84 
2. Commercial capital bill.VND 10,741 12,438 12,794 
2.1- Capital from state budget bill.VND 5,152 5,770 7,205 
2.2- Owned  capital bill.VND 2,218 2,510 1,395 
2.3- Loan bill.VND 2,973 3,780 3,826 
2.4- Other bill.VND 398 378 368 
3. Workers Person 177,754 188,658 221,032 
4. Revenues and Profits  bill.VND    
4.1- Revenues  bill.VND 25,129 28,437 30,390 
4.2- Profit bill.VND 989 661 420 
4.3- Losses bill.VND 673 695 708 
6. Contribution to state budget bill.VND 1,738 1,425 1,277 
6.1- Turnover tax bill.VND 338 381 397 
6.2- Profit tax bill.VND 347 200 118 
6.3- Import-export tax bill.VND 578 464 377 
6.4- Tax on Special commodity bill.VND 39 45 4 
6.5- Tax on capital bill.VND 112 104 111 
7. Debts to pay bill.VND 9,947 12,535 14,943 
7.1- Debt to state budget bill.VND 636 667 661 
7.2- Debt to the  banks bill.VND 5,681 7,825 9,627 
8. Debts to collect  bill.VND 5,853 7,444 8,189 
Source: MOF, Department of SOE 
 
 
On the other hand, SOEs are still a major source of tax revenue to the state and 
explain the reluctance of the GOV to devolve itself from these types of activities. For 
example, in 1998, the contribution of agricultural SOEs to the state budget amounted to 
VND 1.3 trillion. How that compares with total budget outlays to SOEs as well as with 
the total losses to society from supporting inefficient SOEs are still questions that need to 
be addressed in future studies.  
 
In addition to the questionable performance of SOEs, support given to loss-
making SOEs results in an uneven playing field between private enterprises and SOEs. 
This in turn discourages the private sector from investing in areas where SOEs are 
dominant and reduces the incentives for SOEs to operate efficiently. The most cost-
effective means for the GOV to increase the levels of investment in the rural sector is to 
provide an environment that is conducive to private sector investment. However, the 
GOV does not seem to be convinced of this argument: at the same time that some SOEs 
are being equitized, privatized or liquidated, new SOEs are being formed, an example 
being in the sugar sector.  In general, allocation of state and local public expenditures 
towards agro-f od processing SOEs crowds out capital to small and medium scale rural 
enterprises. For example, the Viet Nam Bank for Agricultural and Rural Development 
portfolio of medium and long-term outstanding loans to the corporate sector in 1998 was 
VND 1,506 billion. Of this amount, 85% was given to SOEs and only 15% to non-SOEs 
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(see ANZDEC-IFPRI, 2000). The state bias in favor of SOEs has therefore indirect 
negative effects on the investment levels of the private sector.  
 
A common argument to support SOEs is that they help generate employment. 
However, SOEs in the rural sectors do not seem to alleviate rural unemployment to a 
significant extent. Small and medium-scale private enterprises (SMEs) are usually more 
successful at absorbing rural labor and reducing rural- rban migration.  According to the 
World Bank (1998), the labor to capital ratio of a private firm is 10 times that of a SOE. 
In addition, a job created in a SME requires a capital investment of about $800 compared 
to $18,000 in a SOE.  Although the agricultural sector has been performing well in recent 
years, the failure to increase off-farm employment through small and medium-size rural 
enterprises threatens further development and poverty alleviation in the rural sector.   
 
Public Expenditures and Gender Equity 
 
The analysis of public expenditures in agriculture does not immediately lend itself 
to a differential assessment of the impact on men and women. First, public expenditures 
on agriculture are not reported by the type of recipient (poor or non-poor, male r female, 
etc.), neither are revenues (such as water fees) disaggregated by the type of payer.  
Second, there is little available information on intra-household decision-making behavior 
or allocation of resources which makes it difficult to analyze the implications of public 
expenditures on individual household members. Third, although one can usually infer the 
gender implications of public spending by looking at whether some sub-sectors are 
traditionally dominated by a specific sex, in Viet Nam, gender bias in many aspects of the 
agricultural sector is minimal.  For example, 70 percent of the female labor force and 68 
percent of the male labor force work in agriculture and related services (VLSS 1998). 
And despite the fact that the hourly farm wage rate of a female is lower than for a male, 
the mean per capita income of a female-headed household in rural areas is 17 percent 
higher than for a male-headed household (VND 2.643 million versus VND 2.264 
million). In the general economy, the female unemployment rate is lower than the male 
one (4.5 percent versus 6.2 percent) and poverty measures are lower for femal -headed 
households than for males (World Bank 1999a).  
 
In spite of these difficulties, the analysis of other type of evidence suggests that 
some aspects of public investment in agriculture could be improved in order to promote 
gender equity.  The two main aspects discussed here relate to extension and agroindustry.  
Concerning extension, it is often reported that the existing public extension services is 
often targeted to men.  That has important implications for the access and adoption of 
modern technology by women in rural areas.  As documented elsewhere (see ANZDEC-
IFPRI 2000), doi moi has been accompanied by a “feminization” of agriculture, a process 
by which a greater number of women are engaged in agriculture, while men often migrate 
to urban areas or engage in non-farm activities. In spite of the increasing importance of 
women in Viet Nam’s agriculture, the extension service is still mainly oriented toward 
men. An appropriate redesign of extension programs that target women could be a move 
in the right direction. 
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Concerning agroindustry, the link between public expenditures in agriculture and 
gender equity is more indirect. The previous section has shown that a large share of 
public expenditures in agriculture is devoted to SOEs engaged in agroprocessing. These 
are typically capital intensive enterprises that have little potential for increasing 
employment.  On the other hand, there is an indication that small and medium enterprises 
constitute the majority of firms in agroindustry and female employment in this sector 
represents a large share of total employment. Therefore, by favoring capital intensive 
large SOEs, public expenditures de facto limit the growth of total employment and 
penalize the growth of female productive employment. 
 
 
4. Budget Decision-Making and Institutional Issues 
 
 As in all other sectors, the Ministry of Planning and Investment (MPI) has the 
most important role in allocating investment expenditures to the agricultural sector, while 
current expenditures are allocated by the Ministry of Finance (MOF).  The coordination 
between these two ministries and the MARD is not always transparent. This lack of 
coordination is partly reflected in an imbalance between capital expenditures and O&M 
funding. In general, too much emphasis is placed on new investments in rural 
infrastructure without accounting for their implication on the associated O&M 
expenditures needs. Therefore, in many areas such as rural roads and irrigation systems, 
new construction works deteriorate quickly resulting in inefficient public investment. 
 
 At the local level, the departments of agriculture have little say or control over 
budget allocation or actual expenditures. Each province negotiates the amount it will get 
for agricultural expenditures with the department or divisio  f the MPI (for investment 
expenditures) and the finance department or division of the MOF (for current 
expenditures). This means that agricultural sector spending at the central and local levels 
are not well integrated and local spending in agriculture does not necessarily reflect 
national priorities set by the MARD. Moreover, the negotiation process is far from 
transparent as the process is not open to other provinces or other line ministries.  It can 
often result in an unequal and unfair distribution of state expenditures among provinces 
and depends more on the negotiating power of the province.  A more systematic 
mechanism where budget allocation follows a specific formula would establish a more 
transparent and equitable system.   
 
Another important issue is the lack of sufficient transparency and accountability 
in reporting and publishing public expenditures. For example, public expenditures data 
on agriculture are not disaggregated by function (such as extension, research, land 
reclamation, etc.), agricultural SOEs accounts are not always audited, and information 
about transfers or subsidies that go to individuals or SOEs is not disaggregated by the 
type of beneficiary and the product covered.  There is also lack of consistency of the data 
betwen different ministries, between the local and central levels, and between different 
departments of MARD. Data between and within ministries are often not shared, 
resulting in duplication of efforts and lack of information to take effective decisions. 
Although the GOV has improved its general budget accounting procedure, more needs to 
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be done to improve transparency and accountability in agricultural expenditures and 
revenues at both the central and local levels. One way to address these problems is to 
develop a common computerized data-base that can be shared by all agencies.   
  
5. An Agenda for Reform 
 
 Despite tremendous achievements in the agricultural and rural sectors, there are 
many improvements that could be made in Viet Nam’s public expenditures management 
that could lead to even higher performance.  In addition to the long-term needs to 
enhance the budgetary process, fiscal transparency, coordination between ministries, and 
targeting of public expenditures to poorer provinces, there are three import nt issu s that 
the country could tackle in the agricultural sector in the immediate term.  
 
(i) Reallocate public spending from investment in private goods such as 
marketing and processing into public goods such as agricultural research 
and extension.  Many loss-making SOEs in the agricultural sector are imposing a 
large budgetary burden on the government as well as crowding out private sector 
investment. The GOV could identify a few agricultural loss-making SOEs (for 
example some in the sugar industry) and reallocate the state subsidies, transfers, 
and investment that went to these SOEs towards financing new extension centers 
and re-organizing the agricultural research system.  The GOV could start by 
doubling the extension budget and increasing the agricultural research budget to 
reach about 2 percent of agricultural GDP.  This reallocation could be reflected in 
the new 2001-2005 PIP and the 2001 annual budget. The reallocation should be 
accompanied by mechanisms ensuring strong linkages between research and 
extension, the participation of the private sector in the provision of these public 
services, the accountability to the farmers, and priority given to the public 
services for the poorest communes. 
 
(ii) Base the irrigation water fee on consumptive use. Currently, the water fee 
in Viet Nam is based on paddy production levels rather than volume of water use. 
This results in excessive water use, problems in collecting the water fee, and 
insufficient recovery of O&M costs. Before increasing the water fee to improve 
cost recovery, some local authorities could start by implementing new 
mechanisms to measure water use and charge the water fee depending on 
consumption.  This has already been successfully implemented in some localities 
in Viet Nam and could be extended to other areas.  
 
(iii) Extend pilot projects to develop water user associations. The benefits of 
water user organizations in terms of water use efficiency, cost recovery, and 
improvement in service delivery have been proven in Viet Nam and elsewhere.
The GOV could extend the pilot programs that were developed in Tuyen Quang 
Province and North Nghe An and Son Chu to other areas within the next two or 
three years.  Eventually, the whole irrigation system in Viet Nam could be 
managed by water user associations.   
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6. Future Research Needs  
 
 Based on the above analysis, there are five main areas that need further 
investigation in the future.  These topics were not addressed thoroughly in the current 
report due to lack of data and the limited time-frame of the study. 
 
(i) Further in-depth research is needed to evaluate the specific impact of public 
expenditures in the agricultural and rural sectors on the poorest segments of the rural 
population.  In that context, one may look at the performance of the Hunger Eradicatio  
and Poverty Reduction Program (HEPRP) in reducing rural poverty in rural areas. 
 
(ii) The impact of public expenditures on gender in general needs more thorough analysis 
and requires linking household level data with macroeconomic data. 
 
(iii) A study on the performance of the SOEs in the agricultural and rural sectors is also 
warranted including the net contribution of these SOEs to the state budget and their 
impact on the economy in general.  
 
(iv) Rural credit plays a very important role in he agricultural and rural economy and 
could be a major factor in smoothing consumption, income and investment needs. A 
separate study on public expenditures and rural credit would be a useful addition to the 
current study.  
 
(v) The decision of how much to allocate to public investment in agriculture is linked to 
the decision of how much to allocate to other sectors. Cost and benefit methods of 
analysis for intersectoral allocation of public investment are often very data intensive. 
Research to address thi  problem is still at a very early stage in Viet Nam. A study to 
introduce the basic analytical tools and apply to Viet Nam should be a priority for future 
PER. 
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APPENDIX TABLE A1 
 
GROSS VALUE OF AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION AT CONSTANT 1994 
PRICES, 1994-97 
 
 1994 1995 1996 1997 
  (in billions of VND, at constant 1994 prices) 
Total 74,838 79,812 83,967 88,663 
Food crops 51,465 54,034 56,814 59,559 
     Paddy and other cereals 40,220 42,110 44,654 46,953 
     Vegetables and beans 4,531 4,984 5,088 5,246 
     Fruits 5,431 5,578 5,688 5,943 
     Other 1,283 1,362 1,384 1,417 
Industrial crops 10,331 12,149 12,806 13,989 
Animal husbandry 13,042 13,629 14,347 15,206 
  (Share in total, percent) 
Food Crops 68.8 67.7 67.7 67.2 
     Paddy and other cereals 53.7 52.8 53.2 53 
     Vegetables and beans 6.1 6.2 6.1 5.9 
     Fruits 7.3 7 6.8 6.7 
Industrial crops 13.8 15.2 15.3 15.7 
Animal husbandry 17.4 17.1 17.1 17.2 
Source: IMF (1999) – Table 5 
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APPENDIX TABLE A2 
 
ALLOCATIONS OF THE PUBLIC INVESTMENT PROGRAM OF 1996-2000 
TO THE AGRICULTURAL SECTOR 
(in Trillion VND) 
 
Total State Household FDI Total % of State % of State
Investment Total of which Investment % Investment Credits
State Credits 
Total Investment 460.00 96.80 142.40 76.90 76.50 144.30 100.00% 100.00% 100.00%
Agriculture 95.50 21.90 42.90 22.50 24.20 6.50 20.76% 22.62% 29.26%
   General Agriculture58.50 2.90 34.90 18.00 14.20 6.50 12.72% 3.00% 23.41%
   Water Management14.50 14.50 3.15% 14.98% 0.00%
    Forestry 13.00 4.00 4.00 3.00 5.00 2.83% 4.13% 3.90%
    Storage 9.50 0.50 4.00 1.50 5.00 2.07% 0.52% 1.95%
Source: Socialist Republic of Viet Nam - Public Invesment Program 1996-2000. Table III.2, page 20. Hanoi, June 1996. 
SOE Investment
Investment Structure for the Period 1996-2000
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 APPENDIX TABLE A3 
SUBSIDIES AND CURRENT TRANSFERS IN 1998 
(in Million VND) 
 
Source: MOF 
  
Total 
Expenditures  
in 
Agriculture  
Total 
Current 
Expenditures 
in 
Agriculture 
Subsidies and 
Current 
Transfers to 
Agriculture  
Subsidies and 
Current Transfers 
as Share of Current 
Expenditures 
in Agriculture  
Subsidies and 
Current Transfers 
as Share of Total 
Expenditures 
in Agriculture  
  Total  4,591,435 1,098,778 195,174 17.8% 4.3% 
Of which:      
Cultivation 189,373 77,750 31,279 40.2% 16.5% 
Animal husbandry 77,416 28,272 23,807 84.2% 30.8% 
Veterinary activities 68,917 50,804 3,127 6.2% 4.5% 
Forestry and related activities 363,703 233,021 12,012 5.2% 3.3% 
Forestation 85,863 10,057 1,679 16.7% 2.0% 
Fixed cultivation & 
sedentarization 188,721 122,533 65,012 53.1% 34.4% 
Irrigation & related activities 2,469,736 162,634 21,627 13.3% 0.9% 
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APPENDIX TABLE A4 
 
DISTRIBUTION OF  AGRICULTURAL STATE EXPENDITURES AT THE CENTRAL AND LOCAL LEVELS 
 (in Million VND) 
 
 1997 1998 
 State Central Local State Central Local 
  Total  3,712,494 2,071,2501,641,2444,591,4352,755,649 2,013,787
Of which:        
Cultivation  130,725 50,537 80,188 189,373 48,257 141,116 
        
Animal husbandry 85,448 42,259 43,189 77,416 38,012 39,403 
        
Veterinary activities 65,970 11,745 54,225 68,917 5,106 63,811 
        
Forestry and related activities 315,235 57,627 257,608 363,703 77,623 286,080 
        
Forestation 48,815 2,161 46,654 85,863 45,613 40,250 
        
Fixed cultivation & sedentarization 270,289 174,753 95,536 188,721 97,254 91,468 
        
Irrigation & related activities 1,806,371 946,684 859,687 2,469,736 1,422,333 1,047,403 
        
National Programs on reforestation 
and land reclamation 642,702 636,956 5,746 642,702 636,956 5,746 
Source: MOF
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APPENDIX TABLE A5 
 
SOURCE OF FUNDING FOR SELECTED RESEARCH INSTITUTES 
(in Million VND) 
 
 
Source. Personal Interviews With Above Research Institutes. 
 
 
 
 
 1996 1997 1998 
 Source Source Source 
Institute Total Central Local Other Total Central Local Other Total Central Local Other 
              
Food crop research institute 4,114 3,628  486 6,925 6,220  705 6,414 4,622  1,792 
National institute of animal 
husbandry 17,351 5,368 9,971 2,012 27,072 9,594 14,882 2,596 14,021 9,041 2,406 2,574 
National maize research 
institute 2,581 1,950  631 2,636 2,486  150 4,012 3,983  29 
Institute of agricultural 
science of South Viet Nam 8,635 5,135 1,021 2,479 8,116 5,548 784 1,784 10,090 4,778 1,882 3,430 
Cuu Long rice research 
institute 4,490 2,090 300 2,100 4,699 2,049 200 2,450 5,888 2,313 550 3,025 
     0    0    0 
Total 37,171 18,171 11,292 7,708 49,448 25,897 15,866 7,685 40,425 24,737 4,838 10,850 
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APPENDIX TABLE A6 
 
AGRICULTURAL EXTENSION EXPENDITURES FOR SELECTED PROVINCES 
 (in MILLION VND) 
 
Source: Provincial Department of Agricultural Extension
 
 
 
Provinces 1996 1997 1998 1999 
 Total State 
Budget 
Local 
Budget 
Total State 
Budget 
Local 
Budget 
Total State 
Budget 
Local 
Budget 
Total State 
Budget 
Local 
Budget 
1. Ca Mau    1,238 151 900 1,281 158 1,100 1,461 151 1,100 
2. Phu Yen 719 516  920 158 700 1,032 207 700 832 177 600 
3. Dak Lak 942 175 767 1,177 201 976 1,437 217 1,220 1,578 246 1,332 
4. Dong Thap 2,057 163 1,816 2,490 381 2,098 2,412 125 2,289 2,606 220 2,386 
5. Lang Son 406 140 265 553 174 379 511 130 381 573 176 397 
6. Nghe An 1,629 268 1,361 1,645 283 1,361 1,597 264 1,333 1,749 399 1,350 
7. Nam Dinh 741 741  1,578 1,578  1,195 1,175 20 1,182 1,152 30 
Total 6,494 2,003 4,209 9,601 2,926 6,414 9,465 2,276 7,043 9,981 2,521 7,195 
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APPENDIX TABLE A7 
 
Planned Budget Information for Bac Hung Hai IMC (controlled by MARD) 
1999 Plan 
 
Cultivated area under 
irrigation  
124,000 ha 
Provincial coverage 3 provinces and 1 city: Hung Yen, Hai Duong, Bac Ning, 
and Southern part of Da Long district of Hanoi 
Irrigation system 200 km of primary canals, 13 irrigation control works, more 
than 500 pumps, and several thous. kms of secondary and 
tertiary canals 
Costs in VND billion Revenues in VND billion 
 
Salaries and wages 1 Water Fees 7 – 8 
Large repairs 3.9   
Regular & small 
repairs 
2.7   
Electricity (580 
VND/kw) 
0.2   
Management  0.92   
Services for flood and 
storm  
0.023   
Transfer of technology 
or training 
0.13   
Compensation for 
unplanned losses (i.e. 
in case fees are not 
fully collected) 
1.4   
Depreciation 0.35   
Other 1.32   
Total 11.9   
Source: Personal Interview 
 
The water fee charged by this company is 90 kg of paddy per ha for the spring season 
and 60 kg of paddy per ha for the summer and fall seasons.  The provinces keep 60 
percent of the fee and give 40 percent to the IMC.  Costs that are not covered by 
water fees are transferred from the GOV to the IMC. However, the revenues of 7 to 8 
billion are based on the assumption that the water fees will be fully collected.  The 
manager of the IMC believes they will collect only about 60 to 65 percent of this 
amount.  If they get less than their 7 to 8 billion, they are allowed to use their 
compensation fund (1.4 billion) and if that is not enough, they have to reduce their 
activities such as repairs, maintenance, etc.  Cost recovery in this IMC therefore does 
not exceed 50 percent. The budget of this IMC was approved by MARD.
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APPENDIX TABLE A8 
 
IRRIGATION COSTS AND REVENUES: BAC DUONG IMC 
(in Million VND) 
 
Target 1996 1997 1998 1999 
Total Costs 16,723 24,445 27,224 37,709 
1. Investment Costs 3,400 10,914 13,702.5 23,670 
1.a. Construction and 
Rehabilitation 
3,400 6,914 7,722.5 15,670 
1.b Amortization of existing 
infrastructure assets 
0 4,000 5,980 8,000 
     
     
2. Operation and Maintenance 13,323 13,531 13,522 14,012 
2.a Salaries and Wages 1,652 1,975 2,691 3,027 
2.b Electric and pumping cost. 8,971 7,578 7,359 7,656 
2.c Regular maintenance & repair 2,113 3,483 2,870 2,800 
2.d Collection Costs 587 495 604 576 
2.e Overhead costs     
2.f Taxes     
2.g Other Costs     
     
     
Total Revenues 21,098 11,171 13,840 12,526 
1. Water Fees 9,795 8,244 10,070 9,602 
2. Subsidies from GOV 11,33 2,927 3,770 2,924 
Source: Personal Interview 
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APPENDIX TABLE A9 
 
IRRIGATION COSTS AND REVENUES: NORTHEN NAMHA IMC 
(in Million VND) 
 
 
Target 1996 1997 1998 1999 
Total Costs 24,008 23,470 18,019 22,463 
1. Investment Costs     
1.a. Construction and 
Rehabilitation 
    
1.b Amortization of existing 
infrastructure assets 
    
     
     
2. Operation and Maintenance 24,008 23,470 18,019 22,463 
2.a Salaries and Wages 2,597 3,300 3,325 2,802 
2.b Electric and pumping cost. 11,287 11,249 7,903 10,482 
2.c Regular maintenance & repair 5,765 4,233 2,956 4,896 
2.d Collection Costs 712 577 700 516 
2.e Overhead costs     
2.f Taxes     
2.g Other Costs 3,647 4,111 3,135 3,767 
     
     
Total Revenues 20,902 19,495 13,216 14,033 
1. Water Fees 11,867 9,617 11,667 8,600 
2. Subsidies from GOV 9,035 9,878 1,549 5,433 
Source: Personal Interview. 
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APPENDIX TABLE A10 
 
IRRIGATION COSTS AND REVENUES: QUANG BINH IMC 
(in Million VND) 
 
Target 1996 1997 1998 1999 
Total Costs 4,375 3,712 3,468 3,968 
1. Investment Costs 2,226 1,679 1,205 1,468 
1.a. Construction and 
Rehabilitation 
2,034 1,271 797 1,070 
1.b Amortization of existing 
infrastructure assets 
232 408 408 398 
     
     
2. Operation and Maintenance 2,169 2,023 2,258 2,500 
2.a Salaries and Wages 670 789 934 1,120 
2.b Electric and pumping cost. 442 489 583 576 
2.c Regular maintenance & repair 605 505 536 567 
2.d Collection Costs 392 230 187 231 
2.e Overhead costs     
2.f Taxes     
2.g Other Costs  10 18 6 
     
     
Total Revenues 6,162 4,709 4,885 5,242 
1. Water Fees 5,991 4,709 4,540 5,066 
2. Subsidies from GOV 0 0 300 0 
3. Other 171 0 45 176 
 Source: Personal Interview. 
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APPENDIX TABLE A11 
 
IRRIGATION COSTS AND REVENUES: AN GIANG IMC  
(in Million VND) 
 
Target 1996 1997 1998 1999 
Total Costs 3,836 4,409 5,116 5,670 
1. Investment Costs 1,179 1,332 1,041 1,195 
1.a. Construction and 
Rehabilitation 
314 363 147 0 
1.b Amortization of existing 
infrastructure assets 
865 969 894 1,195 
     
     
2. Operation and Maintenance 2,657 3,077 4,075 4,475 
2.a Salaries and Wages 411 497 747 767 
2.b Electric and pumping cost. 992 1,308 1,837 1,852 
2.c Regular maintenance & repair 88 122 334 539 
2.d Collection Costs 491 525 520 571 
2.e Overhead costs     
2.f Taxes 39 34 10 11 
2.g Other Costs 636 591 627 735 
     
     
Total Revenues 3,892 4,460 5,187 5,474 
1. Water Fees 3,892 4,460 5,187 5,474 
2. Subsidies from GOV     
3. Other     
Source: Personal Interview. 
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APPENDIX TABLE A12 
 
IRRIGATION COST AND REVENUES: UNG HOA IMC 
(in Million VND) 
 
Items 1996 1997 1998 1999 
Total cost 6,054 5,423 7,417 6,923 
1. Investment Cost 586 443 461 461 
1.a  Construction and 
rehabilitation  
    
1.b Amortization of existing  
infrastructure assets 
586 443 461 461 
2. Operation and maintenance 5,468 4,980 6,956 6,455 
2.a Salaries and wages  671 1043 1,122 1,244 
2.b Electrical pumping costs 706 925 1,628 1,243 
2.c Regular maintenance and 
repair 
1,724 1,096 1,490 1,438 
2.d Collection cost 294 234 282 278 
2.e Overhead cost     
2.f Taxes 139 135 6 6 
2.g  Other costs 1,934 1,547 2,428 2,246 
Total revenue 6,253 5,472 7,418 6,927 
1. Water Fees 6,157 4,905 6,519 5,982 
2. Subsidies from Government  280 540 690 
3. Other 96 287 259 255 
Source:  Personal Interview 
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